| em inist theory has had aii undoubtable-but inconsistent-influence | on developmental psychology. Although feminist perspectives have I productively challenged developmental models centered on male ex periences (Gilligan 1982) and have called attention to socialization prac tices that reproduce systematic gender inequalities (Bern 1993) , more radical feminist perspectives on scientific epistemology and methodology have had considerably less influence (see Rosser and Miller 2003) . O n the whole, developmental psychologists tend to embrace the logical-positivist goals and assumptions o f straightforward empiricism (summarized in Sprague and Zimmerman 1993) , emphasizing the pursuit o f objective, quantifiable facts about hum an development that are free o f historical and personal bias. In contrast, feminist standpoint epistemology and feminist postmodernism would claim that objective understanding o f hum an de velopment is fundamentally impossible and that psychological models o f development function as culturally specific origin-stories reinforcing the interests o f dom inant social groups.1 Although many psychologists would consider these critiques to be fun damentally irreconcilable with standard empirical methods (see Chafetz 2004) , others have sought workable compromises between feminist epis temology and empirical research.2 These compromises are typically m an ifested in qualitative interview studies that aim to empower research par ticipants by allowing them to articulate their own subjective experiences and to replace statistical reductionism with thick description.3
These methods, however, engender a num ber o f epistemological di lemmas when applied to developmental investigations. Specifically, recent research on the interpersonal construction o f selfhood through autobi ographical storytelling raises troubling questions about the extent to which qualitative investigations actually coconstruct the developmental phenom ena they seek to investigate.4 My goal in this article is to elucidate how this dilemma has manifested itself in my own qualitative, longitudinal research on sexual identity7 development over the past ten years (Diamond 1998 (Diamond , 2000 (Diamond , 2003a (Diamond , 2005a (Diamond , 2005b and to suggest how a m ore explicit integration o f feminist epistemologv with research on the developmental functions o f autobiographical narrative can transform and advance the knowledge gained from developmentallv oriented qualitative research.
Feminist empiricist perspectives on sexual identity developm ent
Sexual identity7 development is conventionally defined as the process by which sexual-minority7 (i.e., nonheterosexual) individuals come to acknowl edge and accept their same-sex sexual orientation and to develop a positive integration between their nonheterosexual identity and other aspects o f selfhood. Given the hegemonic status o f heterosexuality7 , the processes through which heterosexual identities develop have, not surprisingly, re ceived scant attention (with the notable exceptions o f Hyde and Jaffee 2000; Tolman 2002 ). Early models o f sexual identity development were riddled with problems that will be familiar to feminist critics of scientific m eth odology and epistemologv. First, most were based on data collected exclu sively from men, and thus when these models were applied to women, women appeared "off time" or "off course" with respect to the major developmental transitions that were proposed (Sophie 1986 ). Second, the models suggested impossibly uniform, inexorable, and linear developmental trajectories, beginning with maladjusted confusion and progressing toward healthy ego integration, consistent with the long-documented bias in de velopmental psvcholog}7 toward notions o f progress, goal attainment, and the consolidation o f autonomous "selfhood" (Miller and Scholnick 2000) .
These models also presumed fundamental continuities between early and later erotic experiences, as well as between childhood gender atypicality and adult same-sex sexuality7 (Boxer and Cohler 1989) , reflecting the historical conflation o f homosexuality7 with gender inversion (Krafft-Ebing 1882). Correspondingly, sexual identity7 models typically conveyed an implicit bi ological essentialism in which same-sex desires were always the stable prod ucts o f intrinsic, early-appearing sexual predispositions. This notion directly contradicts the proliferating evidence for fluidity, circumstance, and even choice in same-sex sexuality, particularly among wom en.5 Also, consistent with most contemporary developmental psychology, these models adopted fundamentally individualized notions o f sexuality and identity that placed the solitary person at the center o f analysis, granting only ancillary roles to culture, community, and relationships despite accumulating evidence o f the fundamental importance o f these domains for wom en's sexual development (Peplau and Garnets 2000; Diamond 2003b ).
Finally, all o f these models were based on the reports o f openly iden tified gay and lesbian adults retrospecting about events and feelings that transpired up to thirty years earlier. N ot only did this produce what An drew Boxer and Bertram Cohler criticize as a "developmental psychology o f the remembered past" (1989, 325) , but it failed to acknowledge that individuals' memories o f the sexual questioning process were not objective snapshots o f "what happened" but rather active reconstructions o f self hood that their conscious and unconscious agendas fundamentally influ enced.6 Perhaps the m ost im portant o f these agendas was validation o f one's lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity, implicitly manifested by consistency with the com ing-out stories rapidly proliferating in multiple media outlets (Plummer 1995; Russell, Bohan, and Lilly 2000) .
Over the years the weaknesses o f sexual identity research have been ably critiqued and (with varying success) corrected. Such corrections are typically made in the context o f parallel revisions to the broader study o f adolescent sexuality, where a more nuanced, contextual assessment o f youths' sexual feelings and behaviors increasingly replaces the long-standing emphasis on theoretically impoverished tabulations o f the timing, frequency, and risk profile o f various sexual behaviors (Tolman and Diamond 2001; Tolman, Striepe, and Harm on 2003; Savin-Williams and Diamond 2004) . Conse quently, contemporary studies o f sexual identity development are now more likely to study both women and men, to employ qualitative methods, to follow individuals over time, to take cultural and interpersonal contexts more seriously, and to devote more significant attention to sexual fluidity and developmental discontinuity.
These changes have undoubtedly enhanced our understanding o f the complex psychological process through which individuals with same-sex attractions and behaviors come to think o f themselves (or not, as in Diamond 2003a (or not, as in Diamond , 2005a (or not, as in Diamond , 2005b as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Nonetheless, they are not without deeper problems, especially when considered from the per spective o f feminist philosophy o f science. To elucidate this point, the im plicit rationale for undertaking qualitative, longitudinal investigations o f sexual identity development bears discussion.
W hy collect longitudinal narratives?
The collection o f longitudinal, qualitative interview data has been advocated as an im portant methodological "fix" for many o f the pitfalls o f traditional sexual identity research. N ot only do qualitative interviews allow individuals to articulate subtleties about their subjective experiences that conventional quantitative surveys poorly represent (Tolman and Brydon-Miller 2001) but also longitudinal observation has been posited as a particularly powerful corrective to the problem o f retrospective distortion (Boxer and Cohler 1989) . As Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz note in an influential article, "It was common for [respondents] to say that prior changes in sexobject choice were part o f a past history o f self-misperception, and that they had finally found their sexual 'place.' A follow-up interview often contradicted their assertions" (1977, 174 ; emphasis added). Thus, in this conceptuali zation, longitudinal observation allows one to "catch" inaccuracies o f mem ory as well as motivated attempts at self-presentation (Hardin and Higgins 1996; Thorne 2000; Pasupathi 2001) , thereby allowing the psychologist to model the identity development process on the basis o f more accurate data about individuals' "real" sexual-developmental trajectories.
It was for these reasons that I launched, in 1994, a longitudinal in terview study o f adolescent w om en's sexual identity development that integrated detailed qualitative analysis with more conventional quantitative investigations o f the prevalence and developmental timing o f different acts and experiences (Diamond 1998 (Diamond , 2000 (Diamond , 2003a (Diamond , 2005a (Diamond , 2005b . My goal was a relatively straightforward one: to examine young wom en's sexual identity development from w om en's perspectives and particularly to launch a systematic inquiry into the experiences o f change, fluidity, and situational variability in same-sex sexuality that had long been anecdotally noted in the psychological literature on female sexuality but that had received little systematic empirical attention (reviewed in Baumeister 2000) . In particular, I hoped that by following young wom en over time I could capture changes and discontinuities in desire, behavior, and iden tity before they were potentially erased by w om en's selective memories. By eliciting detailed narratives T intended to more accurately represent the nature o f these phenom ena via w om en's nuanced descriptions o f their antecedents, subjective quality, and eventual repercussions.
Sure enough, over the ten years o f the study the majority o f participants have changed their identity labels and have undergone notable fluctuations in their sexual behavior and even their self-reported sexual attractions (Diamond 2000 (Diamond , 2003a (Diamond , 2005a (Diamond , 2005b , allowing me the opportunity to question wom en in detail about the motives behind and consequences o f these transitions both as they occurred and as they were recollected years later in ensuing interviews. From this perspective, then, the use o f a qual itative, longitudinal approach would appear to be a success.
Rut it is no t quite that simple. Rather, as T have analyzed and reanalyzed these data over the years, T have become increasingly preoccupied widi two fundamental dilemmas that spring from die very nature o f my qualitative, longitudinal methodology and that have critical implications for feminist investigations o f hum an development. The first dilemma concerns the prob lem o f discerning which version o f events should be considered more ac curate when wom en's self-reported autobiographical narratives show di vergence and self-contradiction over time (which T call the authenticity problem). The second dilemma concerns the extent to which wom en's own participation in the study-specifically, the process o f regularly recalling and recounting sexual events and memories to me during a series o f qualitative interviews-has fundamentally influenced, and some might say created, the very identity development process T have sought to model ( the reflexivity problem). Roth o f these issues are undoubtably familiar to those well versed in feminist and postmodernist philosophy o f science, and my goal is not to rehash their basic parameters. Rather, in the following sections T first illus trate the specific manifestations o f each o f these problems within longitu dinal sexual identity research and then argue that theoretical and empirical work on the developmental functions o f socially recounted autobiographical narratives (Pasupathi 2001 ) provides a productive way to work within these dilemmas from a feminist framework, to consider a more useful and gen erative set o f questions about the phenom enon o f sexual identity devel opm ent and how psychologists should study it.
The authenticity problem: "W hat really happened?"
First interview
In fourth and fifth grade, I was aware that I wasn't doing the things I that other girls did, and that made me feel bad. I was a tomboy, played with my brother and did the things that he did. . . . Later on, in junior high, everyone started to date and I wasn't into the dating thing, and that made me wonder about my sexuality and think back to how I'd been different from other girls. But I still didn't connect it to my sexuality, since I still had crushes on boys, and I would think "I'm straight, I just don't have anyone I really want to date." It wasn't until my senior year o f college that I really began to question, 'cause I m et a lot o f gay people, started to hang out with them and really enter their w orld. Eventually I m et a woman that initiated som ething, and that was it. (Interview with anonymous respondent, 1995)
Two-year follow-up
The first thing I think about now is having crushes on camp coun selors-that's my m ost vivid m em ory now. T hat's when I started to fight w ith myself about it, saying "I better stop this. ..." That was when I was fifteen. I was sort o f scared, but it wasn't all that con scious. It got m ore conscious when I was maybe a sophom ore in college. I had a fight with this friend about this "coming o u t" pro gram that everyone in our dorm had to go to. I thought it was totally stupid, and I didn't want to go, and she said, just for the sake o f argument, "Well what if I was gay, what would you think about that! " And the whole thing really stayed with me, and I kept thinking afterward "Why did that get me so angry, why was I so mad at her?" But it took me another year to really put it together. I remember always being called a tomboy when I was really young, but I didn't really understand what that meant. (Interview with same anonymous respondent, 1997)
Five-year follow-up
I think it was just looking at wom en and feeling sexually attracted to wom en and no t knowing how to deal with it 'cause it was som e thing that had never been talked about. Being confused. I seemed to feel that familiar quiver in my thighs when looking at a woman rather than just a man, and that and the other part was that I was always a tomboy and that stereotype always w ent with lesbians. But around ten, eleven, twelve I started wanting to hang out m ore with certain counselors at camp, and they all happened to be women. (Interview with same anonymous respondent, 2000)
Which version o f this respondent's com ing-out story is true? Did she first discover same-sex attractions through crushes on camp counselors, her lack o f interest in heterosexual dating, her overly vehement objections to a college information session on coming out, or feeling quivers when she looked at other girls?
The authenticity problem springs from the conventional emphasis in longitudinal qualitative m ethodology (exemplified by Blumstein and Schwartz 1977) on catching and correcting memory errors or reconstruc tions by attending to discrepancies between accounts given at different times. The stakes, from an empiricist perspective, are high-if the re searcher inadvertently accepts an inaccurate report as authentic (i.e., "I experienced my first same-sex attraction at the age o f ten" vs. "I had no awareness o f same-sex attractions until I was in college" ), one risks build ing a model o f sexual identity development that fundamentally misrep resents this process (e.g., "Sexual minorities typically experience their first awareness o f same-sex sexuality7 in middle childhood" ).
Yet, taking a step back, it becomes apparent that the very framing o f the authenticity problem relies on two problematic assumptions: first, that the goal o f longitudinal research is to uncover a true and generalizable trajectory o f development; second, that consistency across successive lon gitudinal accounts is a marker o f authenticity7 , such that we should pay m ost attention to those aspects o f an individual's autobiographical nar ratives that have undergone the least change over time. Both o f these presumptions are misguided. First, researchers are increasingly challenging the notion that sexual identity development is an inherently linear and internally coherent process with an objectively discernible beginning, m id dle, and end, casting doubt on the notion that developmental psychol ogists should seek to discover or validate one or m ore discrete "pathways" from heterosexuality to homosexuality7 in the first place." Second, findings from psychological research on autobiographical memory suggest prob lems with using consistency as an implicit marker for authenticity7 . Al though it m ight seem straightforward enough to assume that accurate memory for a particular event facilitates consistency7 in its telling and retelling, this assumption sidesteps the m ore basic dilemma o f defining and identifying "accurate memories" to begin with. All memories are dynamic and situationally influenced (Davies and H arre 1990; Schacter 1996; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000) , and autobiographical memories are particularly sensitive to individual's present goals, self-perceptions, and 7 Sophie 1986; Cass 1990; W einberg, Williams, and Pryor 1994; Peplau and Garnets 2000; Diam ond 2005b. interpersonal contexts.8 This is perhaps particularly true for the autobi ographical memories o f lesbian, gay, and bisexual-identified individuals, whose "authenticity" as members o f this social category (in the eyes o f the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community and the culture at large) is often implicitly judged on the basis o f recounting a series o f childhood and adolescent events that have been deemed emblematic o f "homosexual" development, including early feelings o f differentness, latent and unnam ed same-sex desires, social stigmatization, and even adolescent suicidality (Plummer 1995; Russell, Bohan, and Lilly 2000; Savin-Williams 2001) .
Thus, whereas researchers employing longitudinal assessments tend to assume that immediate recountings are accurate and only later recollec tions are distorted and reconstructed, findings from psychological research indicate that this is no t necessarily the case. Rather, narrative reconstruc tion is an ever-present process through which individuals actively enact present goals and self-perceptions through autobiographical reflection and recall, and it shapes the very encoding o f personal experiences (reviewed in Pasupathi 2001) as well as the recollection o f these experiences five minutes or twenty years later. Perhaps most im portant, consistency is itself an im portant m otivator for reconstruction and reinterpretation, given that individuals typically seek to present a stable and coherent sense o f self to themselves and to others.9
Hence, the very process o f telling self-stories to social partners (or social scientists) engages multiple psychological mechanisms that prom ote later consistency by organizing and consolidating preferred versions o f events (Schank and Abelson 1995; Tversky and Marsh 2000) . Consequently, the question posed earlier-"Which o f two discrepant accounts is really true?"-begins to seem fundamentally unanswerable, and the practice o f tacitly assuming the veracity o f a respondent's consistent accounts comes to seem equally problematic. This is no t to suggest that consistency is fundamentally arbitrary or that it has no meaning whatsoever within the context o f the self-story, only that it may mean something altogether different than first thought. Perhaps the question we should be asking is not "W hat was the impact o f this (true) event on X?" but "W hat is it about this particular scenario or memory that has given it such prominence as a core feature o f this individual's narrative sense o f self?" A standard tenet o f logical-positivist scientific m ethodology is that the process o f investigating the phenom enon o f interest must remain fun damentally independent o f the phenom enon itself. As exemplified by the quotations above, qualitative interviews typically-and some would say unavoidably-threaten this requirement. The intense interpersonal en gagement afforded by in-depth qualitative interviews, especially w hen the topic at hand is personal and personally meaningful to the participants, tends to engender reflexivity, or bidirectional influence, between re searcher and participant.
Strict empiricists consider reflexivity a threat to the neutrality o f the researcher and the independence o f the data, and they therefore advocate clear boundaries between researcher and participant and careful standard ization o f interviewer behavior to keep bias at bay. In sharp contrast. postm odern feminist perspectives on scientific m ethodology (particularly feminist standpoint epistemology) actually celebrate and welcome reflexivity as productively disrupting the traditional power imbalance between researcher and participant (Baber 2004) , challenging the rigid Western dichotom ization o f self and other (H arding 1998), and perm itting deeper and more accurate knowledge "through participating in an empathic re lationship rather than through a private, neutral process" (Welch-Ross 2 0 0 0 ,1 1 5 ). As Robyn Fivush argues, "More objective knowledge will be garnered from the scientist and subject participating together in con structing knowledge than from either viewpoint alone" (2000, 89) .
Importantly, however, these perspectives tend to take for granted that the researcher-participant relationship, and the knowledge produced in the context o f this relationship, occupies a singular m om ent in time. Yet, in the context o f developmental research, when qualitative interviews be tween the same researcher and the same participants are repeated at m ul tiple time points, the implications o f the reflexivity problem change. In this respect, the developm ental^ oriented work o f Monisha Pasupathi (2001) is particularly pertinent. She argues that the conversations we have about ourselves with social partners are themselves im portant forces for developmental change largely as a function o f two key principles: cocon struction, referring to the fact that any autobiographical recollection told to a social partner is fundamentally the product o f both the speaker and the interpersonal context, and consistency, referring to the fact that the narratives we tell about ourselves feed forward to canalize future recol lections. This alters the autobiographical knowledge base so that we are successively more likely to recollect and recount memories that portray a consistent sense o f self. In sum, "what we tell certainly influences, and may become, what we 'know' about our own p a s t.. . . The social shaping o f memory may also be a process by which the self is socially shaped" (Pasupathi 2001, 661) . Pasupathi (2001) supports her perspective with a sweeping synthesis o f empirical research on the specific cognitive processes underlying coconstruction and consistency in the domain o f autobio graphical memory, and thus one m ight argue that her work elucidates the psychological underpinnings o f what Michel Foucault describes as the productive nature o f discourse, such that language and other regulated social practices "systematically form the objects o f which they speak" (1 9 7 2 ,4 9 ).
Although Pasupathi was speaking specifically o f individuals' "real-life" interpersonal conversations with friends, lovers, family, and colleagues, the methodological implications with respect to conversations with researchers are notable and profound. Specifically, her work suggests that the researcherparticipant relationship (especially in the context o f qualitative, longitudinal, autobiographical interviews) no t only coconstructs the very self-story being told to the researcher but also has lasting implications for the participant (and perhaps for die researcher as well). Consider, then, the implications for studies o f sexual identity7 development, in which processes o f change and stability in sexual self-concept are the primary locus o f interest. Ac cording to die principles outlined above, this sexual self-concept is, to some degree, a creative work in progress that takes shape during die sexual identity interview as the individual organizes and coordinates his or her autobio graphical memories with respect to his or her own goals and the presumed goals o f the researcher (as in one o f die examples quoted earlier, where some participants assumed that I wanted only "good examples" o f sexual identity discovery).
Yet long after the interviews end, the coconstructed autobiographical narratives they elicited remain forces for continued identity development, further channeling and organizing self-views in the service o f consistency and coherence. Thus, no t only m ight sexual identity be conceived as an em ergent property o f the qualitative sexual identity interview-"no t some thing we have but something we do in interaction" (Fivush 2000, 97)-but sexual identity development m ight be correspondingly conceived as an emergent property o f longitudinal observation. Modifications in sexual self-concept might, in fact, become clearest, most coherent, and most formative the m om ent that the individual begins to answer the question, "So, has anything changed about the way you see your sexual identity since the last time we spoke?"
Refraining developmental questions
O f course, the aforementioned dilemmas o f authenticity and reflexivity are only problems from a strict empiricist perspective. As noted earlier, both feminist standpoint epistemology and feminist postmodernism are unremittingly skeptical about claims regarding scientific truth and n eu trality altogether, and they would therefore cast doubt on both the pos sibility o f identifying "authentic" identity narratives and the possibility o f neutral, fully independent relationships between researcher and partici pant. Yet does this obviate the possibility o f gaining any systematic u n derstanding o f sexual identity development?
The challenge o f refashioning scientific practice so that it generates useful and meaningful knowledge while accounting for the multiplicity, partiality, and inherent interdependence o f that knowledge has, o f course, been a long-standing project within feminist philosophy o f science.10 My own approach to this challenge, in the specific context o f longitudinal sexual identity research, springs from the fundamental role o f autobio graphical narrative in this domain. Specifically, I would argue that one way to "save" the study o f sexual identity development from the inherently partial, coconstructed, and contextualized nature o f the qualitative lon gitudinal interview is to move these interviews from the domain o f method to the domain o f content, following in line with parallel approaches by theorists (obviously Foucault 1980), sociologists (Plum mer 1995), his torians (D 'Emilio and Freedman 1988; Duberm an, Vicinus, and Chauncey 1989), and, most recently, developmental psychologists (Pasupathi 2001; Pasupathi, Mansour, and Brubaker forthcoming) . In other words, we need to shift from thinking about autobiographical narratives as a way o f determining what develops to thinking about autobiographical narra tives as-to some degree-that which develops.
In other words, if the goal o f (repeatedly) asking respondents "H ow did you first come to first realize your same-sex attractions?" is to arrive at a consistent and generalizable model o f how this process "actually" unfolds in childhood or adolescence, then this objective-and the use o f longitudinal, qualitative interviews to achieve it-is problematic. But I would argue that this m ight no t even be the most interesting or devel opmentally informative question we could ask. Rather, a more revealingand answerable-question is "H ow do individuals craft developmentally specific, goal-relevant interpretations o f their own erotic subjectivity in the service o f maintaining a comfortable, coherent, and socially mean ingful sense o f self?" This is a particularly useful perspective to apply to longitudinal qualitative research because it fundamentally changes the nature and significance o f discrepancies between successive autobiographical narratives. No longer are they unwelcome signs o f inaccuracy that must be resolved (presumably by prom pting participants to "think harder" or "be honest" ); rather, they are actually the most im portant data generated by longitudinal interviews, since they reveal critically im portant information about how individuals make different types o f meaning out o f their personal pasts depending on changing social, interpersonal, and developmental contexts. Forthcoming work by Pasupathi, Emma Mansour, and Jed Brubaker provides an elegant example o f this approach, as the authors have focused on identifying specific types o f self-event relations that individuals invoke when telling about autobio 10 Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; H arding 1991; Hckm an 1997. graphical events that do or do not characterize the way individuals view themselves. Their preliminary investigations indicate four types o f self event relations: explain/illustrate relations, in which an event is described as ex emplifying an existing trait or characteristic; dismiss relations, in which an uncharacteristic event is discounted; cause relations, in which an event is portrayed as instigating change in the self; and reveal relations, in which an event prompts discovery o f a hidden truth about the self. The applications to coming-out stories are notable (particularly with respect to dismiss and reveal cases), and Pasupathi's team has already begun to productively explore the specific relevance o f this approach for clarifying sexual identity devel opm ent (Brubaker 2004) .
Expanding this approach to investigate longitudinal change in these narrative strategies is the next step. Thus, one might ask no t only why some individuals talk about early same-sex contact in terms o f causing their sexuality and others as revealing their sexuality, but why and how some individuals might invoke causation at one point in time and reve lation at another (to either the same or different social partners) as they actively manage their own understanding o f their erotic autobiography across the life course. From the perspective o f standpoint epistemology, one m ight argue that this approach shifts from seeking a multiplicity o f knowledges by studying different individuals to seeking a multiplicity o f knowledges through examining multiple time points in any single indi vidual's life.
Finally, the problem o f reflexivity in the context o f longitudinal, qual itative sexual identity interviews actually emerges as a particular strength o f this m ethodology when one considers the specific importance o f socially performed autobiographical narratives for the development and enactment o f sexual^ minority identities (Plummer 1995; Jones 2000) . If the narrative self is something we "d o " rather than "have" (Fivush 2000) , then how better to model the process o f identity development and maintenance as it is enacted in countless com ing-out and "how I first knew" conversations with friends, lovers, and parents than to instantiate that process in the researcher-participant relationship over time? This is made particularly clear in the case o f one participant (pseudonym "Anna" ) for whom the identity development process is largely a series o f conversations. During the first interview Anna recounted that she had first begun questioning her sexuality during her second year at college, when she was supporting a close friend who was questioning her sexuality. Anna reported that she and her friend had a series o f long and involved conversations about bisexuality and about their own sexual feelings, and Anna claimed that she inadvertently started to "tag along" in her friend's com ing-out process.
Eventually, both women identified as bisexual. By the second interview, however, Anna had entered graduate school and was living in a much more socially conservative environment; by the five-year follow-up inter view she had decided to identify as heterosexual instead o f bisexual: It is particularly fascinating to read this narrative with an eye to the identity construction process itself, regarding no t only the conversations with friends that have undoubtedly shaped her self-concept but also the rhetorical strategies that she uses during the interview to create a specific interpretation o f her own motives for identity change and their reper cussions. She repeatedly signals her own ambivalence about reidentifying as heterosexual, perhaps in order to leave herself the possibility o f future same-sex sexuality. For example, she says "I used to identify as bisexual, I think I still do in some contexts," notably shifting from past to present tense, and she also explicitly notes that part o f her motive for identifying as heterosexual is to " appease her friends" and feel politically "safe," given her new more conservative environment. Later, she seems to actively en gage me in substantiating this interpretation o f her identity transition by concluding "So le t's just say it's out o f safety," as if we need to collectively agree on a "reason" for the transition that will preserve consistency with her prior interviews while also leaving open the possibility for future at tractions to wom en (for the record, however, by the eight-year followup interview she had gotten married, although she continued to acknowl edge attractions to women).
Thus, to the extent that the interview process feeds back to shape the identity development o f the participant, this process is analogous to par allel mechanisms occurring in individuals' social relations and in their own self-talk and thus is analyzable in these contexts. Consequently, acknowl edging rather than constraining reflexivity allows the researcher to consider a variety o f questions regarding how discursive social relations constitute a critical force for psychological development.
Conclusion
Importantly, the notion that sexual identity should be investigated from a fundamentally narrative perspective is no t new. Num erous (typically feminist) theorists have argued that a lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity is better conceptualized as a status o f becoming rather than being (Fuss 1989; Butler 1990; Phelan 1993) , suggesting the importance o f investigating sexual identity as "a narrative, a story" (Garber 1995, 87) rather than an essence. Yet, historically, this point o f view has been more influential within the domains o f feminist and queer theory, sociology, history, and cultural studies than developmental psychology. To some extent this is ironicafter all, if sexual identity takes its very meaning from the ongoing, re constructive, recursive processes o f speaking, remembering, and acting across diverse social and interpersonal contexts over the life course, then all studies o f sexual identity are fundamentally developmental.
Yet to the extent that developmental psychologists continue to mine sexual identity narratives only for the "objective truth" about how samesex sexuality "naturally unfolds," we will remain hamstrung in our under standing o f sexual-minority development. No qualitative interview can pro vide a fundamentally accurate portrait o f how one's sexual-minority identity was "really" experienced in-or developed from-erotic feelings and be haviors at age eight, or twelve, or fifteen. However, analysis o f the specific correspondences and gaps between longitudinal narrative accounts within the specific domain o f the interviewer-interviewee relationship reveals how we "come to report a particular event given the situation we are in" (Fivush 2000,98) and how individuals construct a "self in progress" out o f disparate stands o f experience to suit their own lay notions o f development (Pasupathi, Mansour, and Brubaker forthcoming) .
Thus integrating feminist epistemology with recent psychological re search on the coconstruction o f autobiographical narrative provides a road map for working within the problems o f authenticity and reflexivity in sexual identity research to reach systematic and useful information about this phe nom enon in different individuals and contexts. Feminist epistemology, then, leads us to conclude not that longitudinal, qualitative research on sexual identity development has no valid knowledge to offer but rather that this knowledge is o f a fundamentally different sort than we originally thought, elucidating development not as an inexorably forward-moving program with a fixed outcome but as an emergent, discursive, fundamentally social process. Importantly, this does not imply that developmental psychologists should systematically abandon any and all attempts to locate erotic events and experiences in "real" chronological time in investigating sexual-minority lives. Rather, following Joyce Nielsen (1990) , I would advocate a dialectical approach that synthesizes and alternates between a focus on developmental events and a focus on their reenactment, reconstruction, and recounting, working toward an understanding o f sexual-identity development that most ably represents its fundamentally social-contextual status. 
